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Over the past few years, there have been an increase in the development and
improvement of circumvention tools like Tor and Psiphon. These tools provide an en-
vironment for citizens of oppressive regimes to access websites freely without fear of
identification, these tools aid democracy activists and journalists in West Africa in using
the Internet securely. A similar circumvention tool was developed by us. This tool cir-
cumvents DNS and IP address blocking/filtering, by leveraging technologies developed by
criminal botnet enterprises.
To improve and maintain the circumvention tool we developed, it is important
to quantify the number and country of origin of users. System statistics are used to
give feedback to the US State Department, who funded this project. We need to show
them that target users are taking advantage of the developed system. Considering that
the system helps provide anonymity to users as well as bypassing DNS and IP filtering,
and system users have a high demand for privacy, we must not collect sensitive user
information. We therefore develop statistics that aim to not compromise user anonymity.
Two probabilistic data structures are introduced, evaluated, improved upon and
used, to keep system statistics without compromising user privacy. The first data structure
is the negative survey. Using negative survey we can keep an aggregate count of user
countries of origin without knowing the country of origin of any individual session by
asking the user to report a country that they do not belong to. Negative survey allows
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us to calculate how many accesses there have been from each country, while keeping
insensitive user information The second data structure is a probabilistic counting algorithm
which, without keeping a list of already encountered data, like IP addresses, estimates the
number of distinct elements in a large collection of data. We use hash values to obtain the
number of unique users of the system. This algorithm is based on statistical observations
made on bits of hashed values of records. Our records contain the hash values the users
ssl certificates. We store the least significant bit that was set in the ssl certificate hash.
From the bit position of the lowest bit that is not set, we get a good estimate of the
number of system users. We contribute to this technique by considering when the number
of collisions of the hash values will affect the estimate and use this amount to give a better
estimate. This also allows us to decide on-line the proper register size to maintain
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West Africa is known to be held back by poverty, political instability and poor
human rights records. With censorship technologies becoming widely and readily avail-
able, and with the fact that it has been observed that Israel and France are providing
censorship technologies to West African governments [5, 16], it becomes apparent that
the suppression of a free press in the region includes Internet censorship. Many democracy
activists and journalists in West Africa are technically unsophisticated. When repressive
local governments start to take full advantage these Internet surveillance technologies, the
results are likely to be catastrophic for reform movements and journalists in the region.
Hence, the activist community is concerned about their digital security. They are aware
that the computers and Internet which they rely on are becoming insecure. They are also
aware that technical threats will increase in number and sophistication.
Circumvention and anonymization tools allow the activist community of a country
to speak freely without fear of persecution. With the increasing need for these tools,
research has gone into the development and improvement of more sophisticated and user
friendly tools. Maintaining a system statistics without compromising user anonymity is
a difficult problem. The Tor project, a group committed to a free and open Internet,
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currently stores lists of unique IP addresses on their node bridges for at least 24 hours
uptime so that they can collect more accurate statistical data [18]. Even though these IP
addresses are never transmitted, the very storage of unique IP addresses poses a security
risk for system users. Solutions are therefore needed to offer privacy guarantees during
the collection of the system’s statistics.
1.1 Problem Domain
1.1.1 Political Threat
As West African governments become aware of the impact of social media tools,
they will increase network surveillance and track IP addresses. Surveillance tools are in
place in some West African countries like Cote d’Ivoire to help the police track Internet
criminals. In December 20th, 2010, in Cote d’Ivoire, there was unrest following Laurent
Gbagbo’s refusal to step down after losing Presidential Elections, Globalvoicesonline.org
translated French tweets [20], one of which read, @Sanders225 To those who tweet from
their computers I hope you have installed software to hide your IP address #civ2010. This
tweet is evidence of the growth in the level of sophistication on the part of West African
Internet users and their desire for anonymity.
There have been other examples of Internet communication being affected, SMS
messaging blocked on election day until results were officially announced, to hinder local
activists from reporting what they had seen in polling booths. It is important to provide a
system for activists to ensure that threats to Internet freedom, such as those seen in Iran,
will not occur in West Africa, as Internet penetration and network surveillance reaches
the same levels as other parts of the world.
Many countries have laws restricting access to pornography. Ghana and Nigeria
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Figure 1.1: Censored network and secure USB
have laws in place that allow government authorities to demand network use information
with little or no due process. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Internet censorship currently consists
primarily of the sporadic blocking of access to IP addresses [15]. Rather than using
technical measures, most on-line censorship currently involves the arrest and incarceration
of bloggers, activists, and citizen journalists [15].
1.1.2 Technical Threat
Technically literate Internet users have realized that anonymity is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve. As Scott McNealy of Sun Microsystems said, “You already have
zero privacy, Get over it” [3]. With current events, like uprisings in the Middle East, the
importance of on-line media in promoting democracy has become apparent. Unfortunately,
repressive governments, like Iran, Tunisia, and China, have found on-line social media
useful for identifying activists [19]
1.2 Application
To counter on-line censorship and media suppression, we developed and packaged
a distributed proxy system, which is used to bypass network censorship technologies by
democracy advocates and citizen journalists of West Africa. See figure 1.1 We created
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secure USB drives, whose contents are encrypted to avoid incriminating their owners. The
drives can be booted directly, or run as plug and play with encrypted archives, as long as
the user has the passphrase. A number of useful tools for anonymous communications
allow users to access Internet resources with reasonable anonymity guarantees. Censorship
systems in countries like China keep users from accessing anonymous communications
tools by both filtering the Domain Name System (DNS) records that map names to IP
addresses and blocking access to IP addresses associated with those services. The USB
drives include technologies that effectively circumvent these mechanisms. Automated
access to anonymization systems will be provided, and users will also be able to access
other Internet services directly. The tool created circumvents DNS filtering and IP address
blocking by leveraging technologies developed by criminal botnet enterprises. Botnets are
distributed systems built from criminally compromised PCs. They are central to spam,
phishing, pharming, and identity theft scams. The criminal gangs running botnets use fast-
flux technologies to avoid detection and remain anonymous. Connections change their
DNS names weekly. Fast-flux technologies change the IP addresses these DNS names
map to every few minutes. This ruse has made it impossible for western law enforcement
agencies to find botnet operators. We used the same approach for creating a distributed
proxy system. Running the USB drives, other nodes where access to anonymization tools
is available will relay messages to users whose access is blocked, to aid them in getting
around DNS filtering and IP address blocking. Advocates and journalists use this to
circumvent censorship without putting themselves at risk.
The US State Department sponsored this project there is a need to provide reliable
statistics of system use, to show that people are taking advantage of the technology
developed, and money spent on this project is being put to good use. The method of
collecting the system statistics has to be secure and anonymous to prevent identifying
users. In the event that a repressive government may gain access to the system database,
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we do not want them to find identifiable information linking a user to the system. To
accomplish this, we use two data structures with strong guarantees of privacy to track
the number of unique users and their country of origin.
1.3 Negative Survey
To track users, service providers query location information directly. The problem
with this method is that it reduces user anonymity. To solve this problem will be to
use reverse auctions also known as negative survey, by creating an aggregate frequency
distribution of category membership without collecting specific information from the users.
In a negative survey, the service provider offers the user a list of mutually exclusive groups.
The user is asked to select one or more categories that they do not belong to. In this
manner, negative survey stores a negative representation of the data. In [14], a sensor
network base station uses negative samples to reconstruct a histogram of the original
sensor reading. We use this method to track aggregate statistics of the country of origin
of system users.
1.4 Probabilistic Counting
We use a probabilistic counting algorithm originally introduced introduced by Fla-
jolet and Martin [10], to estimate the number of unique system users, given a good hash
function [10]. We can take an arbitrary set of data, hash it and use hash values to form
a collection of binary strings storing the position of the least significant bit in the binary
representation of the hashed values. The pattern observed indicates the number of distinct
values in data [10]by using the position of the leftmost zero in the string as an indicator
of log2 n where n is the total number of data in the set.
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This result is not a great estimator [10], because it gives at best a power of
2 in estimating the number of distinct elements. To improve the estimate, multiple
independent hash functions are averaged. This method is expensive because hashing
is expensive. Stochastic averaging can use a single hash function instead of multiple
independent ones, and split output into many buckets [10]. This thesis, looks at our
contribution to the method in [10]. We considered the effect the birthday paradox has on
the hashed values and how collisions affect the final estimate. This results in the estimate
undercounting the number of users. We account for this effect and propose a solution.
1.5 Organization
The outline of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 describes the motivation behind
this thesis, exploring the issues and challenges with anonymous. It discusses the application
area, the distributed proxy system we developed, and how we will incorporate anonymous
statistics. This chapter also introduced the data structures used to implement anonymous
statistic.
Chapter 2 discusses previous work on anonymous statistics, and how it applies
to our work, it also discusses how the Tor network reports the number of users. Chap-
ter 3 gives the background. It introduces information needed to understand our work,
by discussing the data structures used in greater detail and the logic used to provide
anonymity. It includes verification done to obtain a good hash function and our contribu-
tions to probabilistic counting procedure. Chapter 4 presents the analysis of these data
structures. This analysis looked at the anonymity the overall system presents as well as
its performance. Chapter 5 summarizes our technique with conclusions based on what we




The need to provide privacy in statistics collection is a growing research area. There
are various methods implemented in systems especially for surveys, to collect statistics
without leaking compromising information. For example, Differential privacy a new
research area that uses a mathematical rigor in privacy preserving analysis of data, helps
in releasing statistics without compromising the privacy of the individuals [4], it ensures
that a limited amount of risk is involved in participating in a database. This is because
Differential privacy does not guarantee absolute privacy [4].
To contribute to this growing research area, we use a mixed method approach by
using two probabilistic data structures (reverse auction and hash functions). With this, we
hope to achieve a method of obtaining the statistic metrics of our developed system while
preserving privacy. The following sections discuss related work on the two data structures.
2.1 Tor Case Study Discussion
The Tor network is widely used by hundreds of thousands of users, and it makes
it possible for these users to hide their location when they access various online services.
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Therefore, it is expected that sensitive information are not used in obtaining the usage
statistics of the Tor network. [13] describes the approaches used by the Tor network to
collect aggregate usage data and how the number of the system users were estimated from
this data. Tor uses two approaches to estimate the number of users [13]; the first approach
was used to get the number of new and returning users while the second approach was
used to estimated the number recurring users. The difference between these two is based
on the design they used in their estimates which is based on Tor’s directory protocol. As
of 2010, there were eight of such directory authorities [13]. Seven out of the eight report
the number of directory request they are answering every day. The method proposed
in [13] was to weight the request seen by a single directory authority with the expected
fraction of the request that the directory authority should see. The assumption was that
a directory authority sees 1 out of 6 requests. [13] multiplied the reported requests by 6 to
obtain an estimate count of the new or returning daily users. There were a few difficulties
with this approach which was based on some uncertainties.
The second approach was used to estimate the number of recurring daily users,
and they based the approach on the fact that each client will be required to refresh its
network information every few hours to make indistinguishable path selection decisions. To
estimated the number of users, they count the number of network status requests on a fast
directory mirror. They estimate how many network status requests there are in a network
by dividing the local request number by the share of requests that a directory mirror thinks
it should see. This estimate is flawed because of outliers and missing values [13].
An alternate approach proposed was to count the number of daily unique IP ad-
dresses on a relay that sees most of the clients at least once a day [13]. Directory mirror
keeps the observed client IP addresses in memory for at most 24 hours and report the
absolute number of distinct addresses and then discard the IP addresses [13].
The current approach used by the Tor network [13], is to have the Tor bridge
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report the number of unique IP addresses they see everyday. They sum up the unique IP
addresses per day and interpret the result as the estimated number of users with at least
24 hours uptime.
We do not want to use the approach used by the Tor network and store the IP
addresses that access our system because, we do not want any identifiable information
stored in our database even if it is for 24 hours. We believe that our system user can be
identified if the IP address is stored.
2.2 Negative Survey
Negative surveys are closely related to randomized response techniques (RRTs),
because both aim at conducting private surveys rely on a randomizing device to answer
questions in the survey [6]. RRTs uses this to choose among questions while in negative
survey respondents choose among answers [6]. In [7], several formulas needed to generate
a negative database were compared. Negative representations of data have also been
expanded to negative surveys. The application of a negative survey to sensor networks
where the negative survey stores membership information is in [14], the base station
wants to know how many nodes belong to different categories. Each node is aware of the
possible categories and transmits some category to which it does not belong back to the
base station. This is similar to the work described in this thesis, in that each user will be
aware of the different countries and they report a country they do not belong to.
2.3 Probabilistic Counting
Probabilistic counting is similar to a bloom filter [1]. Bloom filters are probabilis-
tic data structures that give a compact approximation on set membership [1], like the
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approach used in this thesis, bloom filters are also performance/memory efficient, which
makes them appealing in a variety of scenarios, from web caching [8] to key reuse in
sensor networks [2]. The hash map data structure is similar to the bloom filter because
both store membership information in a bit vector, the difference is in their functionality.
The bloom filter tries to determine whether an item is in the set or not while probabilistic
counting is used to determine the number of members in the set. Both structures have
no false negatives but some false positives.
2.4 Summary
In this Chapter we discuss related work in privacy preserving statistics. We incor-
porate the method in [14] to obtain the country of origin of a user who gained access to
the proxy system is from and with the probabilistic counting, we can estimate the total




Research Design and Methods
3.1 Negative Survey
Negative database is a database that contains counterfeit data along with actual
data [21]. Negative databases have been expanded to negative survey. Negative survey
is used in this thesis to determine the aggregate number of accesses from a country of
origin while keeping no incriminating information.
Negative survey creates an aggregate frequency distribution of category member-
ship without collecting specific information from users. It is used for conducting surveys
that is mindful of participant’s privacy [6]. It allows users to keep the name of their
country undisclosed by asking them, instead, questions about their country name. An
example a question asked is as follows:
Choose 1, I am not from:
[ ] Chad
[ ] Ghana
[ ] Ivory Coast
[ ] Senegal
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If a user is from Chad, the user will randomly select one of the last three options.
With this method, aggregate user country statistics can be calculated without users di-
rectly disclosing this information [6]. A user will belong to only one these countries and
we are interested in estimating the proportions of the users that positively belong to each
of the countries. We estimate this value. Let pi, j(1 ≤ i, j ≤ t) be the probability that
option Xi is chosen given that the user belongs to X j and ∑i pi, j = 1. Let πi denote the
proportion of the total users that positively belong to category i with ∑i πi = 1. The
probability of selecting Xi is given by:
λi = ∑
j
pi, jπ j (3.1)
[6]
From Equation 3.1 and the fact that ∑i πi = 1, an unbiased estimator of πi is given by:
π̂i = 1− (t−1)λ̂i
where λ̂i = ni/n is an unbiased estimator for λi. With Equation 3.1, a user provided with
a fair, t-1 sided, die can select a country by privately obtaining a value m, and choosing
the mth true option from the top, skipping over the false category.
The relationship between anonymity and accuracy will be quantified with respect
to the probability that a user can be correctly identified. This relationship is developed
from the number of countries (C), the number of users (S), and the number of samples
each user provides (X̄s). The probability that the user is a selected country is denoted
by Pr(Xi = T |X̄s = F) where Xi is the country in question and X̄s is the set of negative
responses related to a user’s latest entry.
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Proof. Using Bayes’ rule,
Pr(Xc = T |X̄i = F) =
Pr(Xi = F |X̄c = T )
Pr(X̄i = F)
Pr(Xc = T ) =
1
C





















We automate this process, having the system automatically report a country other
than the one access is from.
3.2 Probabilistic Counting Algorithm
Probabilistic counting first introduced by Flajolet and Martin is used to give a
calculated estimate of the number of unique users that access our system. The algorithm
is probabilistic in nature because it is based on a hash function of the data it operates on.
3.2.1 Hash Function
Hash functions appeared in 1950 as tools for hash tables. In 1969 Bloom filters
were used to test set membership. In 1977 Carter & Wegan published a paper called
Universal Hashing, where they considered hash function as probabilistic objects. People
became inspired to use hash functions to transform inserted data to random variables or
sequences of random bits if considered from a discrete point of view. Hash functions take
13
Figure 3.1: Pattern hash mapping
elements from the domain of interest and map them into strings of 0’s and 1’s such that
each bit has the same probability to be 0 and the same probability to be 1. They transform
data into independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) uniform random variables. Hash
functions also map data of arbitrary length to data of a fixed length. To make our system
anonymous, we require a hash function that does a random mapping, where no pattern
is observed to make it easily detectable.
While looking for a suitable hash function that meet our requirement of random-
ness, we looked at different hash functions. The main consideration was the pattern in
the hash mapping, for example, Figure 3.1 gives an observable pattern in the mapping of
a hash function h(k) = k mod m. We want our hash function to give a random mapping
to the space with no pattern as shown in Figure 3.2.
A simple multiplication hash function [11] was chosen to be used in the algorithm
14
Figure 3.2: Random hash mapping
and it defined as follows:
Let k be the input, A = a random real number, r = range of the hash function
and M = 0.5× (
√
5−1)
s = k ∗A
x = r * fractional part of s
h(k) = f loor(m∗ x)
[11]
This hash function gives the random mapping of Figure 3.2
3.2.2 Probabilistic Counting Procedure
Probabilistic counting [10], works as follows. Given a function h(x) of range[
0...2L−1
]
that transforms records x ∈ [0, ...,N−1] into integers uniformly distributed
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over the range L, where L is a set of binary strings. Let lsb(y) represent the position of the
least significant 1−bit value of the binary representation of y. So an element in the record
x, will be mapped to lsb(h(x)). As discussed in 3.2.1, the hash function will transform
the records into a string of random bits. It is observed that if the hash values h(x) are
uniformly distribute, it is expected to see a sequence of 10xxx... with probability 1/2, a
sequence of 110xxx... with probability 1/4, a sequence of 1110xxx... with probability
1/8. With the strings being uniform, it can be generalized that a sequence 1k0..., appears
with probability of 1/2(k+1).
The idea of the algorithm is to record this occurrences in a vector bitmap[0...L-1],
that is, maintain a bitmap vector of L bit initialized to zero, and for each element that
we hash, find the lsb(h(x)) set the corresponding position on the bitmap. We keep track
of the prefixes 1k0.... The bitmap depends on the set of hashed values and not on the
frequency of the x. If an element occurs more than once, it will be counted once. We
expect that if d is the number of distinct elements in M, then bitmap[0] is accessed
about n/2 times approximately, bitmap[1] is accessed approximately n/4 times [10]. For
example, let us assume that there are n = 20000 distinct elements, Figure 3.3 shows that
exactly 10000 elements are mapped to bit position 0 that is d2 maps to bitmap[0], the
figure also shows that 5000 elements are mapped to bit position 1, that it d4 maps to
bitmap[1]. It follows therefore that dk maps to bitmap[k-1] [12].
It was proposed in [10] to use the position of the leftmost zero in the bitmap with
rank starting at 0 as an indicator of log2 n. Let P be this value. Based on the assumption
of hash values being uniformly distributed, the expected value of P will be close to :
E(P)≈ log2 n
We therefore estimate the cardinality with 2p, where p is the size of the largest prefix in
the bitmap. If the bitmap is 1k0..., then p = k+1.
16
Figure 3.3: The mapping of 20000 users to the bit position in a bitmap
This works but there is a small bias, the values estimated are slightly off (E[2p] 6=
n). In [9]Philippe showed that, with mathematical analysis, we can find the exact bias
estimator known as the magic constant. [10] proposed to apply this estimator as a simple




















Typically, estimates were found to be one binary order of magnitude off the exact result.
The idea proposed to improve the accuracy of the algorithm was to use m different hash
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functions and a different bitmap table for each hash function and then take the average.
The accuracy should be increased by 1/
√
m. This unfortunately is very costly, because
hashing is expensive. They found an alternative, to use a technique called stochastic
averaging. The idea consists of using the hashing function in order to distribute each
element into one of m substreams randomly computed as α = h(x) mod m. Only the
corresponding bitmap vector of address α will be updated with the information contained
in h(x), ie h(x) divm≡ bh(x)/mc. To compute the cardinality, the position of the leftmost
zero of each of the bitmap pi will be calculated and then calculate the average of all the
bitmaps A = p1+p2+...+pmm . The Cardinality will be equal (1 ϕ)2
A. This method in [10]
was called the algorithm Probabilistic Counting with Stochastic Averaging. As a future
work we hope to further investigate if this algorithm will have a better performance if we
consider storing both the least significant bit and the most significant bit of the hashed
values while keeping track of the m bitmaps.
3.2.3 Birthday Paradox in anonymous statistics
We look into the effect that the birthday paradox will have on probabilistic count-
ing, because the algorithm uses hash functions and there are likely to be collisions occurring
during the mapping. There will be error introduced into the calculation when we have
more than one element mapping to the same bit position in the bitmap. The accuracy of
our method depends on how often this happens. We quantified the number of collisions
that occur and add this value to the estimated cardinality. We investigated the length of
the bitmap L and when to increase the length. We hope to improve the accuracy of the
system to make it robust and flexible.
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3.2.3.1 Birthday Paradox
When considering the birthday paradox, we are interested in the event, A that
among n people, each having a particular day of the year as a birthday, at least two of
them will have the same birthday. We assumed that each day is equally likely for each
person. In order words, the probability that a person born on day r will be 1k , where k is
365.
Proof. This probability is one minus the probability that the n birthdays are distinct [22].
Given as:














The probability of A passes 50% when n exceeds 23.
We need to calculate the minimum number of inputs that will cause a collision.
A collision happens when an element is mapped to a slot that already stores an element.
If k = 2p, and n is number of elements in the sequence, given a certain sample space,
what will be the minimum number of input that will have a 50% probability of having a
collision.
Using the formula of birthday paradox on our system, and with different bit lengths,
we calculated the minimum number of inputs to our system that will have a 50% proba-
bility of having a collision Table 3.1 shows the findings
From Table 3.1, we can see that with a bit length of 16 we only need 320 people








Table 3.1: The number of inputs that gives at least 50% probability of having a collision
necessary to know when the number of collisions in the system will start affecting our
result and cause us to undercount the estimated cardinality.
3.2.3.2 Impact of the Birthday Problem
Having one collision will not affect the efficiency of the result. It is important to
find out when the number of collisions become large enough that it begins to affect the
result causing a leveling of. To determine the number of collision in hashing [17] proposed
a way of finding the expected number of collision in hashing.
3.2.3.3 Expected Number of Collisions
If we have n elements mapped to any one of k slots, to determine the expected
number of collisions, we determine the expected number of elements that will be mapped
to the same slot and the number of empty slots. This will lead to the expected number
of collisions. Note: all slots have equal probability.
Proof. To calculate the expected number of elements mapped to the same slot, let us
consider the random variable,
Xi =
 1 if element i is mapped to slot 1;0 otherwise.
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The number of items that will be mapped to slot 1 is:
X = X1 +X2 + ...+Xn
[17]
the expected value of Xi =
1
k










To calculate the expected number of empty slots, lets consider the probability
that slot j remains empty after all the n elements have been mapped as (1− 1k )
n . The
expected number is as follows:
Proof. Define a random variable as follows:
X j =
 1 if slot j remains empty;0 otherwise.
The number of empty slots: X = X1 +X2 + ...+Xk [17]
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We now calculate the number of collisions from the number of empty slots. Taking
the number of empty slots as X, we know that K - X elements are hashed without collision
and N-K+X are mapped with collisions.
Proof. If Z is the expected number of collisions, we have:
Z = n− k+E(X)




3.2.3.4 Application of the Number of Collisions
We applied the expected number of collisions found in Section 3.2.3.3 to our esti-
mated cardinality and we found out that it resulted in a better estimate of the cardinality
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 shows this result. The bit length used is the figures is 16 and
we used different number of inputs ranging from 10000 to 100000
Figure 3.4 shows that at some point (30000), the estimated number begins to level
off because the register size is has become too small to accommodate the all the inputs,
when we consider the effect of the birthday paradox and compensated for the collisions,
we found according to Figure 3.5, that we get a better estimate.
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Figure 3.4: Cardinality calculated without implementing the birthday paradox
Figure 3.5: Cardinality calculated after implementing the birthday paradox
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2p +(n− k+ k(1− 1
k
)n)
where E = number of users,
K = length of the bitmap and
N = number of actual users
3.3 Summary
This chapter looked at the essential background information of this thesis. We
identified two data structures used to develop a statistics metric of our distributed proxy
system. The data structures are used to collect statistics of the system while preserving
privacy. Section 3.1 discussed the reverse auctions approach method. While Section 3.2
talked about the probabilistic counting structure was used to estimate the number of
unique users of the system. Lastly, we looked into the effect the number of collisions of





The two data structures used in this thesis increase the privacy of the distributed
proxy system we developed, by preserving the privacy of the system users while collecting
statistics. This chapter analyzes the anonymity and performance provided by the statistic




The question we want to answer in this section is, What happens to the user
anonymity if a repressive government gains access to our database, the hash function
used, and a user’s certificate. Will the government be able to associate the user with our
system? It is important to calculate the probability of detecting that the user is infact
associated to the system. It is obvious that we will never have false negatives, because if
the user has used the system, the least significant bit position of the record hashed value
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will be set in the corresponding position of the bitmap. It means that if the position
in the bitmap is not set, then it is acceptable to conclude that the user did not use the
system. However, if the position is set, it is possible that it was set by a different user,
hence it indicates false positive. To calculate the probability of a false positive : From
Chapter 3 Section 3.2, it was established that the probability that bit n is set is 1
2(n+1)
, the
probability that the bit was not set is therefore: 1− 1
2(n+1)
.








The higher this probability is, the higher the anonymity of the system will be.
4.2 Performance Analysis
4.2.1 Probabilistic Counting
4.2.1.1 Effect of Over and Under Counting
In Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2 we showed that we get a good estimate if we add the
number of collisions. It is beneficial to find out if we have the best estimate. If Chapter 3
Section 3.2.2 gives us the correct estimated number of users of our system, it is possible
that there will be some collisions that will occur. We will like to quantify this amount. To
solve this, we took the calculated estimate from Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2 as the number
of input and used that to calculate the number of collisions that will occur. Figure 4.1
shows the result.
Figure 4.1 shows that there will be an over counting in the final result of our
estimate if we implement this.
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For our statistics metrics to give a good result, it needs to be flexible and it
should accommodate as many users as possible. To achieve flexibility, we need to change
the register length at a certain point and know when do implement the change. It is
useful to know what cardinality can be successfully calculated with each register length.
Figure 4.2 shows the mapping for register bit length 16,the figure shows that when the
better estimate is taken as the actual number of inputs, and the number of collisions
brought by this estimate is added to it to produce an even better estimate, this will result
in an over counting of the cardinality and the over counting increases as the number of
actual inputs increases. we suggest changing the size of the bitmap by 1 bit, when the
range between the original probabilistic counting procedure and the overestimated result
grows really large. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 shows the result of bit length 17 and 18
respectively. For length 17 according to Figure 4.3, we see at at about 80000, the range
between the over estimate and the probabilistic counting procedure grows larger, so it is
advised to change the bit length to 18 bits. For length 18 according to Figure 4.4, we see
at at about 160000, the range between the over estimate and the probabilistic counting
procedure grows larger, so it is advised to change the bit length to 19 bits. We propose
that this will make our system more robust.
4.3 Conclusion of Results
This chapter looked at the performance and anonymity analysis that our the prob-
abilistic counting procedure in privacy preserving statistics. If a repressive government or
attacker gets a hold of the whole database, there will be no exact incriminating information
in the database that can be used to successfully identify individual users.
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Figure 4.2: Estimate proposed by Flajolet and Martin compared with the esti-
mate+collision and over counting for register length 16 bits
Figure 4.3: Estimate proposed by Flajolet and Martin compared with the esti-
mate+collision and over counting for register length 17 bits
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Figure 4.4: Estimate proposed by Flajolet and Martin compared with the esti-





The work done in privacy preserving statistics looks at a way of getting the statistic
of the circumvention system developed by us, without compromising the privacy of the
users. Two probabilistic data structures were used to develop system statistics while
preserving privacy. Chapter 3 looks into the design and implementation of these data
structures. Chapter 3 Section 3.1 discussed reverse auctions. With each access a user
gains to our system, the system will automatically report a country other than the one
the user is from. These results can be used to estimate how many users came from
each country. In Chapter 3 Section 3.2, a probabilistic counting structure was used to
estimate the number of unique users of the system. Each user will need a certificate to
get authenticated with the system. A hash will be taken of each certificate and the least
significant bit that was set will be stored in a list known as bitmap. A register does a
logical OR of those bits. The position of the leftmost zero on the bitmap is used to
calculate a good estimate of the number of unique users of the system. Chapter 3.2.3
looked at the addition we made to improved the probabilistic counting procedure to give
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a better estimate in the cardinality by considering the effect that the number of collisions
will make on the calculated cardinality, which results in undercounting of the distinct
number of users.
5.2 Conclusion
We propose combining the two data structures used in this thesis, we will be able
to get necessary information needed for statistics collection while preserving the identity
of the user.
5.3 Future Work
For the future work, we propose investigating and quantifying in greater detail,
how much information about the system users, can be leaked from one bit on the bitmap
in the probabilistic counting structure and develop a method to prevent or minimize this
amount. We also hope to further investigate if the stochastic averaging algorithm will
give a better performance if we use both the least significant bit and the most significant
bit to account for the cardinality.
With the negative survey, we get anonymity for individual users by keeping a
record of the negative responses provided by these users. Given the total database, this
anonymity might decrease. For instance, if the we have 3 countries of reference; Chad,
Ghana and Benin and it is found that 100 people accessed the system. If the histogram of
the responses provided show us that 65 people claim not to be from Chad and 35 people
claim not to be long to Ghana. It can be logical to conclude that most of the people that
used the system are most likely to be from Benin. We will like to further study how much
information can be leaked by the negative survey. Finally after verifying the anonymity
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provided by the two data structures, we will be able to quantify in greater detail how good
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